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PREFACE
Two key areas of our recent foreign and security policy work have been the legal 
responsibility for war crimes and human rights violations, and the prospects of out-
lawing nuclear weapons under international law. As futile as both efforts may have 
seemed at the outset, we were pleasantly surprised when 122 UN member states 
adopted the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in June 2017, and the first 
ratifications followed shortly thereafter in September 2017. The International Cam-
paign for the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) – our long-standing partner and 
recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize for its work in autumn 2017 – played a major role in 
bringing about this treaty.
With our Task Force on Disruptive Technologies and 21st Century Warfare, we have 
plunged ourselves into another seemingly hopeless battle: In response to the current 
rapid development of «artificial intelligence» (AI), we want to establish clear rules for 
the military use of AI and to advocate a global ban on autonomous weapon systems. 
In other words, a prohibition on all future weapons that, once activated, will automat-
ically select their targets and complete their deadly mission without further human 
intervention.
Gregor Enste, who headed the Department of Foreign and Security Policy of the 
Heinrich Böll Foundation until October 2017, deserves the credit for setting up this 
innovative group of experts. We would also like to thank Dr. Frank Sauer with Bundes-
wehr University Munich for leading the task force as its scientific coordinator and for 
managing the contributions to this study.
In its report, our task force has laid out substantial objections to the further devel-
opment of autonomous weapons. They are initially directed at German decision-mak-
ers, calling on them to take a clear stand against autonomous weapon systems, and 
culminate in the hope that these weapons will be banned within the framework of the 
United Nations. 
Ten years ago, when ICAN first proposed banning nuclear weapons under inter-
national law, the idea was met with wry amusement by parts of the security establish-
ment. Those voices became subdued, however, following the adoption of the Treaty 
on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize. 
With its presence at this year’s Munich Security Conference, ICAN’s position has 
finally reached the security policy mainstream. 
We hope that our task force and the activists of the global Campaign to Stop Killer 
Robots will be equally successful in the coming years in their mission to establish pre-
ventive controls for autonomous weapon systems. Important steps have been taken 
by stating the ethical, legal and security concerns in this paper, and by suggesting 
a framework to ensure meaningful human control over weapon systems. It is to be 
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hoped that these objections and suggestions will be heard by our national and inter-
national decision-makers and will focus the further discourse on autonomous weapon 
systems on what really matters: ensuring the inviolable nature of human dignity and 
the humanitarian principles of international law.
Berlin, May 2018 
Giorgio Franceschini
Heinrich Böll Foundation, Foreign and Security Policy Department
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VORWORT
Zwei zentrale Themen unserer außen- und sicherheitspolitischen Arbeit der letzten 
Zeit drehten sich um die rechtliche Verantwortlichkeit bei Kriegsverbrechen und 
Menschenrechtsverletzungen sowie die Perspektiven einer völkerrechtlichen Äch-
tung von Kernwaffen. So aussichtslos beide Unterfangen auch auf den ersten Blick 
erscheinen, so sehr wurden wir in einer Sache im letzten Jahr positiv überrascht: Im 
Juni 2017 verabschiedeten 122 UN-Mitgliedsländer einen Vertrag, der den Besitz und 
den Einsatz von Kernwaffen verbietet, und bereits im September 2017 erfolgten die 
ersten Ratifikationen. Maßgeblichen Anteil am Zustandekommen dieses Verbotsver-
trags hatte unser langjähriger Kooperationspartner, die International Campaign for 
the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), die für ihr Engagement im Herbst 2017 
sogar mit dem Friedensnobelpreis ausgezeichnet wurde.
Mit unserer Task Force on Disruptive Technologies and 21st Century Warfare haben 
wir uns in einen weiteren scheinbar aussichtslosen Kampf gestürzt: Wir wollen in 
einer Phase der rasanten Entwicklung «Künstlicher Intelligenz» (KI) klare Regeln für 
die militärische Nutzung der KI etablieren und uns für eine globale Ächtung auton-
omer Waffensysteme stark machen – also all jener Waffen der Zukunft, die – einmal 
aktiviert – vollkommen autonom ihre Ziele auswählen, ansteuern und ohne weiteres 
menschliches Zutun ihre tödliche Mission erfüllen.
Gregor Enste, der bis zum Oktober 2017 das Referat für Außen- und Sicherheit-
spolitik der Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung geleitet hat, gebührt das Verdienst, diese innova-
tive Expert/innen-Gruppe ins Leben gerufen zu haben, und Dr. Frank Sauer von der 
Universität der Bundeswehr München unser Dank, die Task Force als wissenschaftli-
cher Koordinator geleitet und die Beiträge dieses Berichts koordiniert zu haben.
Unsere Task Force nennt in der vorliegenden Publikation gewichtige Gründe, 
warum der Entwicklung autonomer Waffen Einhalt geboten werden sollte. Ihr Appell 
richtet sich zunächst an die deutschen Entscheidungsträger/innen, sich bei dieser 
Frage klar gegen autonome Waffensysteme zu positionieren, und mündet in der Hoff-
nung auf eine Ächtung dieser Waffen im Rahmen der Vereinten Nationen. 
Als ICAN vor zehn Jahren die völkerrechtliche Ächtung von Kernwaffen ins 
Gespräch brachte, wurden sie von Teilen des Sicherheitsestablishments noch milde 
belächelt. Nach der Verabschiedung des Vertrags für das Verbot von Atomwaffen 
und der Verleihung des Friedensnobelpreises wurden diese Stimmen jedoch leiser, 
und im Februar dieses Jahres war ICAN durch einen Redebeitrag bei der Münchner 
Sicherheitskonferenz schließlich im Herzen des sicherheitspolitischen Mainstreams 
angekommen. 
Es ist unserer Task Force sowie den Aktivist/innen der globalen Campaign to 
Stop Killer Robots zu wünschen, dass ihrem Anliegen einer präventiven Kontrolle 
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autonomer Waffensysteme in den nächsten Jahren ein ähnlicher Erfolg beschieden 
sein wird. Wichtige Schritte dazu sind durch die Niederschrift der ethischen, völker-
rechtlichen und sicherheitspolitischen Bedenken in diesem Papier und den darin 
ebenfalls enthaltenen Vorschlägen zur Wahrung menschlicher Verfügungsgewalt 
über Waffensysteme erfolgt. Es bleibt zu hoffen, dass diese Einwände und Empfehlun-
gen bei unseren nationalen und internationalen Entscheidungsträger/innen Gehör 
finden und sie den weiteren Diskurs zu autonomen Waffensystemen auf das lenken, 
worauf es ankommt: die unantastbare Würde des Menschen und die Prinzipien des 
humanitären Völkerrechts.
Berlin, im Mai 2018
Giorgio Franceschini
Referat Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik der Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Früher, entschiedener und substantieller engagiert und Verantwortung übernehmend 
– so stellen sich seit einigen Jahren viele die zukünftige deutsche Außen- und Sicher-
heitspolitik vor. Es bleibt dabei jedoch eine offene und anhaltende Debatte, wie genau 
Deutschland seiner wachsenden Verantwortung gerecht werden soll, insbesondere in 
Bezug auf seine Streitkräfte – die Bundeswehr. 
Der vorliegende Report geht davon aus, dass ein Nexus zwischen internationaler 
Sicherheit und neuen Technologien entsteht. Dieser bedeutet einen Lackmustest mit 
Blick auf die grundlegenden Normen und Werte, denen Deutschland und die Bunde-
swehr sich bei der Übernahme zusätzlicher Verantwortung verpflichten. Der Report 
schaut dabei im Speziellen auf die militärische Nutzung von Künstlicher Intelligenz 
(KI) und Robotik in Form sogenannter Autonomer Waffensysteme (AWS).
Als Arbeitsdefinition für AWS legt der Report, in Anlehnung an Definitionen des 
Internationalen Komitees vom Roten Kreuz (IKRK) und des US-Verteidigungsministe-
riums, den Schwerpunkt auf Autonomie in den kritischen Funktionen von Waffensys-
temen, also Zielauswahl und Zielbekämpfung. Der Sachverhalt wird jedoch durch die 
Einführung einer Skala mit 5 möglichen Stufen menschlicher Kontrolle und Aufsicht 
genauer aufgeschlüsselt. Dies ermöglicht eine präzisere Untersuchung menschlicher 
Verfügungsgewalt über AWS, samt der in der aktuellen Diskussion gängigen Vorstel-
lungen von «appropriate levels of human judgement», «human oversight», «human 
in» oder «on the loop» sowie «meaningful human control».
Der Report argumentiert, dass die menschliche Verfügungsgewalt über kritische 
Waffensystem-Funktionen einer sorgfältigen Prüfung bedarf angesichts der rechtli-
chen, technischen, moralisch-ethischen und sicherheitspolitischen Implikationen 
von AWS.
Rechtlich gesehen deutet alles darauf hin, dass der Einsatz von AWS mit dem 
humanitären Völkerrecht zumindest in absehbarer Zukunft nicht in Einklang zu brin-
gen ist und dass AWS bisher noch ungelöste Probleme mit Blick auf Rechenschafts-
pflichten und Verantwortungsübernahme bei der Anwendung militärischer Gewalt 
aufwerfen.
Technisch gesehen verfügen autonome Waffen nicht über die notwendigen 
Fähigkeiten, um Unterscheidungs- und Verhältnismäßigkeitsgeboten des human-
itären Völkerrechts gerecht zu werden. Ihr Verhalten ist inhärent unvorhersehbar, ins-
besondere in Szenarien, in denen mehrere AWS interagieren.
Die im deutschen Grundgesetz in Artikel 1 verankerte Achtung der Menschen-
würde schreibt, ebenso wie die internationalen Menschenrechte, vor, dass Maschinen 
die Entscheidungen über Leben und Tod prinzipiell nicht überlassen werden sollte.
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Mit Blick auf globale Sicherheit birgt die Entwicklung von AWS schließlich ernst-
hafte Risiken für die regionale und globale Stabilität und setzt Proliferationsanreize, 
was ihre Nutzung durch solche Akteure befördert, die die völkerrechtlichen Rah-
menbedingungen für den Einsatz militärischer Gewalt missachten.
Vor diesem Hintergrund entwickelt der Report folgende Empfehlungen an die 
deutsche Bundesregierung:
  Verfassen und Veröffentlichen eines nationalen Leitliniendokuments mit Blick auf 
die militärische Nutzung von autonomen Waffensystemen in der Bundeswehr.
  Übernehmen einer einfachen, am IKRK orientierten Definition von autonomen 
Waffensystemen mit dem Fokus auf Autonomie in den kritischen Waffensys-
tem-Funktionen von Zielauswahl und Zielbekämpfung.
  Gesetzliche Verankerung einer Vorschrift zur Wahrung echter menschlicher 
Verfügungsgewalt («meaningful human control») über alle Waffensysteme der 
Bundeswehr, damit eine über Stufe 3 («Software selektiert Ziel vor, und Mensch 
muss Bekämpfung genehmigen») in Waffensystemen hinausgehende Autonomie 
vermieden und «vollautonome Waffensysteme» auf nationaler Ebene effektiv ver-
boten werden.
  Kontinuierliches Erforschen der Interaktionen zwischen Menschen und 
autonomen Funktionen mit Blick auf zukünftige Waffensysteme der Bundes-
wehr, um die Wahrung menschlicher Verfügungsgewalt nachhaltig abzusichern; 
daneben adäquate Ausbildung der Soldatinnen und Soldaten der Bundeswehr im 
Hinblick auf die dazu erforderlichen Techniken, Verfahren und Taktiken.
  Fortgesetzte Nutzung und Regulierung defensiver SARMO-Systeme (Sense and 
React to Military Objects) durch die Bundeswehr, dabei die in diesem Report spe-
zifizierten, strengen Rahmenbedingungen und Beschränkungen für Konstruktion 
und Betrieb anlegend.
  Fortführen und Intensivieren der deutschen Unterstützung für ein internation-
ales, rechtsverbindliches und überprüfbares Verbot autonomer Waffensysteme, 
die der menschlichen Verfügungsgewalt entzogen sind.
Im Hinblick auf ein internationales AWS-Verbot könnte die Übernahme einer 
Führungsrolle und die noch aktivere und entschlossenere Arbeit auf Ebene der Ver-
einten Nationen ein beispielhafter Meilenstein in der neuen Außen- und Sicherheit-
spolitik Deutschlands sein. Deutschland würde damit ein deutliches Zeichen dafür 
setzen, dass es grundlegenden Normen und Werten und gewachsener internationaler 
Verantwortung gleichermaßen gerecht wird.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Engaged and taking on responsibility earlier, more decisively, and more substantially 
– that is how German foreign and security policy has come to be envisaged over the 
last few years. However, it is an open and ongoing debate how Germany will meet its 
growing responsibilities, especially with regard to its armed forces – the Bundeswehr. 
This report argues that there is an emerging nexus of security and new technologies 
which provides a litmus test regarding the fundamental norms and values that Ger-
many and the Bundeswehr heed whilst taking on additional responsibilities. It specif-
ically focuses on the military use of artificial intelligence (AI) and robotics in so-called 
autonomous weapon systems (AWS).
The report adopts a working definition of AWS that, in accordance with definitions 
provided by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the US Depart-
ment of Defense, puts emphasis on autonomy in a weapon system’s critical functions, 
that is, target selection and engagement. However, the report reframes this issue in 
terms of 5 levels of human supervisory control. This allows for closely examining the 
governance of AWS and teasing out what is meant by notions such as «appropriate 
levels of human judgement», «human oversight», «human in» or «on the loop» and 
«meaningful human control».
The report argues that human supervisory control over critical functions must be 
subject to careful scrutiny considering the legal, technical, moral/ethical, and security 
implications of AWS.
Legally, all existing evidence indicates that the deployment of AWS could not 
comply with International Humanitarian Law (IHL) for at least the foreseeable future, 
and that they pose as yet unresolved problems regarding accountability and responsi-
bility for the use of violent force.
Technically, autonomous weapons lack the necessary components to ensure 
compliance with the IHL requirements of distinction and proportionality. Their 
behavior is inherently unpredictable, particularly in scenarios where multiple AWS 
would interact. 
Morally, the guiding principle of respect for human dignity, enshrined in Ger-
man basic law («Grundgesetz») Article 1 (1) as well as in International Human Rights 
Law, dictates that machines should not be making life or death decisions regarding 
humans. 
In terms of global security, the development of AWS poses serious dangers for 
regional and global stability and provides incentives for their proliferation, including 
their use by actors not accountable to legal frameworks governing the use of force. 
In light of this, the report develops the following recommendations to the German 
government:
15
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  develop a national policy on the use of autonomy in weapon systems and make 
that document publicly available;
  adopt a simple, ICRC-like definition of autonomous weapon systems, based 
on the system’s «task autonomy» in the performance of the critical functions of 
selecting and engaging targets;
  stipulate the legal requirement of «meaningful human control» over all Bun-
deswehr weapon systems, avoiding autonomy in target selection beyond level 
3 («software selects the target and a human must approve it before the attack») 
thereby effectively prohibiting «fully autonomous weapon systems» at the national 
level;
  continuously investigate and map out levels of human control for autonomous 
functionality in future Bundeswehr weapon systems to allow the human reason-
ing and control needed (that is, levels 1-3 for critical functions), and train Bunde-
swehr personnel accordingly with regard to the required tactics, techniques and 
procedures;
  regulate the Bundeswehr’s continued use of defensive SARMO (Sense and React 
to Military Objects) systems to satisfy the strict targeting limitations and con-
straints on design and operations specified in this report;
  continue and intensify support for an international, legally binding and verifiable 
ban on fully autonomous weapon systems, that is, weapon systems with auton-
omy in the performance of the critical functions of selecting and engaging targets.
Regarding the international prohibition on AWS, adopting a leadership role and work-
ing even more actively and decisively toward this goal at the United Nations would 
represent an exemplary milestone in Germany’s new foreign and security policy. It 
would send a strong signal that Germany is heeding its fundamental norms and val-
ues whilst living up to its newly grown international responsibilities.
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Introduction
It is by now commonplace to describe Germany as the key player in Europe, a polit-
ically stable economic powerhouse that has markedly gained in global status and 
influence since its reunification in 1990. Engaged earlier, more decisively, and more 
substantially – that is how German foreign and security policy has been envisaged in 
statements by prominent politicians and in key policy documents over the course of 
the last few years. Since the beginning of the US presidency of Donald J. Trump, Ger-
many’s increasing responsibility in matters of global affairs has been emphasized to 
an even greater degree both at home and abroad.
However, it is still very much an open and ongoing debate how Germany’s foreign 
and security policy will go ahead in meeting this growing responsibility, especially 
with regard to the role Germany ascribes to its armed forces – the Bundeswehr.
In its 1994 landmark ruling, the German Federal Constitutional Court allowed for 
the German parliament to deploy armed forces within systems of collective security 
(United Nations, NATO) in «out of area» missions. Since then, taking on additional 
international responsibility increasingly included Bundeswehr missions abroad, 
culminating in the massive German engagement in Afghanistan. Germany still has 
multilateralism (and Europe) in its DNA, of course; in fact, many of the key foreign 
and security policy tenets that earned Germany the positive reputation of a «civilian 
power» (a term coined by German political scientist Hanns W. Maull) remain(ed) con-
stant. At the same time, regarding the nature and scope of its military commitments, 
the last two decades represent nothing short of an epochal change in Germany’s post-
WWII history – and a drastic adjustment for the German armed forces themselves. In 
a still ongoing and challenging process, the Bundeswehr is rapidly transforming itself 
from a Cold War deterrent army into a modern combat-ready fighting force (Enskat/
Masala 2015). Meanwhile the general population, it is crucial to point out, tends to 
remain deeply wary of additional military engagements.
With this in mind, we propose, first, that the self-commitments that Germany 
applies with regard to its military will be indicative for the trajectory of its new, more 
active and responsible-minded foreign and security policy at large. Second, the cur-
rently emerging nexus of security and new technologies provides a litmus test regard-
ing the fundamental norms and values that Germany heeds while heading into this 
future. 
This report analyzes the military use of artificial intelligence (AI) and robotics. It 
specifically focuses on «autonomous weapon systems» (AWS). We closely examine the 
«disruptive» potential of AWS from technical, legal, ethical, and political angles. In 
light of this analysis, the report develops a list of policy recommendations, suggesting 
17
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specific self-commitments for Germany to adopt with regard to the way its military 
engages with AI and robotics.
The commercial sector considers technologies disruptive when they yield new 
products, services and markets and disrupt previously existing structures by displac-
ing established products and leading companies. The Internet is a prime example. 
From a military perspective, the very same technologies can spawn new weapon sys-
tems, practices and even entirely new operational domains. The commercial sector 
is also what currently drives progress in robotics and AI. They will yield disruptive 
effects on the battlefield. In addition, their dual-use character renders them extremely 
prone to proliferation. As a result, a new paradigm of warfare is currently emerging – a 
process that some observers have come to compare with the revolutions following 
the introduction of gunpowder, aircraft and the atomic bomb respectively (Future of 
Life Institute 2015; see also Allen/Chan 2017: 1-6, 10). The impact of technological 
progress on warfare is already generating sharp conflicts with existing international 
legal, ethical, and political frameworks. In the recent controversy surrounding the use 
of armed unmanned aerial vehicles («drones») these frictions have already become 
clearly visible (Sauer/Schörnig 2012) – even while, in this example, the leveraging of 
technologies and practices of automation and robotization as well as data science and 
machine learning for military purposes is only its infancy.
A specific concern motivates this report and unites the authors around a shared 
goal, which they have jointly pursued starting from their diverse backgrounds in var-
ious fields of research. While we hope for the peaceful uses of robotics and AI, and 
while we are aware that they can also benefit the military and law enforcement in 
many respects, we are deeply concerned about specifically those developments sur-
rounding the growing autonomy in weapon systems. Our aim is thus to help safeguard 
against the negative effects of the military application of robotics and AI in autono-
mous weapons. 
To connect our analysis to a German frame of reference, we looked for a basic 
principle to guide the overall thrust of our argument. We found this guiding principle 
in Germany’s basic law (Grundgesetz) Article 1 (1) which states that «[h]uman dignity 
shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority.»
We believe that human dignity is the Archimedean point of the AWS debate. 
For legal and political assessments of AWS may differ, but the German 
Grundgesetz provides the axiomatic ethical reminder that the dignity of 
all humans, including those that military violence is legitimately directed 
against, must be kept intact. Outsourcing the selection and engagement of 
targets to algorithms in military machines is out of the question for a soci-
ety that accepts this imperative. Machines should not make life and death 
decisions. Instead, societies must safeguard meaningful human control 
over weapons and retain human governance within their military’s deci-
sion-making processes on who is being targeted in war.
18
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Since 2013, the parties forming Germany’s government (Bundesregierung 2013: 124; 
2018: 149) have stipulated in their coalition treaties that they will in fact not abdicate 
this human responsibility for targeting decisions. They also pledged to work for an 
international ban on AWS. German diplomats at the United Nations (UN) Convention 
on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) in Geneva have since echoed this at the 
diplomatic level, as have high-ranking military officials in Germany (such as Lieuten-
ant General Ludwig R. Leinhos at the 2018 Munich Security Conference). 
It is our hope that this report further informs and fosters the already ongoing pub-
lic debate in Germany about the issue of autonomy in weapon systems. We especially 
hope that this report helps move German political and military decision-makers fur-
ther toward developing, adopting and publishing an official Bundeswehr policy doc-
ument on autonomy in weapon systems, one that makes the retention of meaningful 
human control over Bundeswehr weapon systems a legal requirement.1 Lastly, we 
find that taking a leadership role by working even more actively and decisively toward 
a legally binding and verifiable prohibition on AWS at the UN level would be an exem-
plary milestone in Germany’s new foreign and security policy. It would send a strong 
signal that Germany is heeding its fundamental norms and values whilst living up to 
its newly grown international responsibilities.
1 The recommendations contained in this report are forward-looking and not exhaustive in terms 
of the specific weapon systems discussed. We recommend a general prohibition on fully auton-
omous weapons, that is, of weapon systems that are not under meaningful human control, the 
requirements for which we examine in this report. In doing so, we note that one size of mean-
ingful human control does not fit all weapon systems. In fact, we prominently discuss defensive 
SARMO (Sense and React to Military Objects) systems engaging unambiguous materiel targets 
(munitions) when there is no time for human intervention as requiring less strict human super-
vision conditions than other weapon systems in order for them to be under meaningful human 
control. Further discussions of specific weapon systems we consider to best be conducted at the 
implementation stage, given, of course, that the authors’ general recommendation that mean-
ingful human control must be retained over all weapon systems finds acceptance.
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1. Concepts and definitions
Autonomous weapon systems (AWS)2 have recently gathered widespread attention, 
particularly since more than 3,700 artificial intelligence (AI) and robotics research-
ers published an open letter in 2015 warning against an impending AI weapons arms 
race (Future of Life Institute 2015). This was followed in 2017 by an open letter to the 
United Nations (UN) Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW)3 from 160 
high profile CEOs of companies developing artificial intelligence technologies, calling 
for the UN «to work hard at finding means to prevent an arms race in these weapons, 
to protect civilians from their misuse, and to avoid the destabilizing effects of these 
technologies» (Future of Life Institute 2017).
Stigmatized as «killer robots» by opponents, AWS are widely regarded as harbin-
gers of a paradigm shift in warfare (Geiss/Lahmann 2017). Prototypes of autonomous 
ground robots, fighter jets, submarines, ships and «swarms» are being developed and 
tested by technologically advanced nations. The US, Russia, China, and Israel are the 
frontrunners, with others, such as the UK and South Korea, following their lead.
There has been extensive discussion regarding how to define autonomous 
weapon systems at the UN’s CCW in Geneva since the issue was first discussed in an 
Informal Meeting of Experts in 2014. Some confusion has arisen, for two main rea-
sons: (1) a framing of the issue as a «levels of autonomy» problem, instead of look-
ing at the human involvement with regard to critical weapon system functions; and 
(2) the concern of several nation states that a prohibitive treaty against autonomous 
weapons would result in the loss of important defensive weapons already in use. It 
is worth pointing out as well that excessive querying of definitions could be used by 
some states to deliberately slow the UN process from getting to the next stage. 
Generally speaking, the AWS debate is organized around two basic understand-
ings of autonomy.
On the one hand, we have definitions building on the assumption that, in order to 
qualify as «autonomous,» a weapon system should possess a «situational understand-
ing» that is comparable to that of a competent human being (UK Ministry of Defense 
2017). The focus here is on the machine’s perceptual and evaluative capabilities or, 
in the words of a recent SIPRI Report, on the «sophistication of the machine’s deci-
sion-making process» (Boulanin/Verbruggen 2017: 6). This requirement cannot be 
2 AWS are currently also discussed under the acronym LAWS (Lethal Autonomous Weapon Sys-
tems). We are not adopting the acronym LAWS because we find that problems with autonomy in 
weapon systems are not necessarily dependent on their lethality.
3 The Convention’s full title is «Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain 
Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscrim-
inate Effects as amended on 21 December 2001». 
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satisfied by any existing weapon system, and it is difficult to make reasonable pre-
dictions about the prospects of constructing machines of this kind. Therefore, these 
notions of autonomy project AWS in some undetermined technological future and are 
not helpful to the debate and to growing concerns about autonomous decision-mak-
ing and action by weapon systems, independently of whether these systems achieve 
situational understanding comparable to that of a competent human being.
On the other hand, autonomy has been defined on the basis of «the human-machine 
command-and-control relationship» (Boulanin/Verbruggen 2017: 5-6) in the fulfil-
ment of a system’s functions, especially the critical functions of selecting and engaging 
targets. According to the definition offered by the US Department of Defense (US DoD 
2017: 13), an autonomous weapon system is thus a weapon that «once activated … can 
select and engage targets without further intervention by a human operator.» This aligns 
with the clear definition proposed by the International Committee of the Red Cross: 
«Autonomous Weapon Systems are defined as any weapon system with 
autonomy in the critical functions of target selection and target engagement. 
That is, a weapon system that can select (i.e. detect and identify) and attack 
(i.e. use force against, neutralize, damage or destroy) targets without human 
intervention» (ICRC 2016: 8).
By shifting the focus from the endowment of human-like intelligence to mere «task 
autonomy» (Tamburrini 2016) and adopting definitions of this latter kind, some pres-
ently operating weapon systems have to be qualified as autonomous, their limited tar-
get baskets notwithstanding (for they perform critical functions of target selection and 
engagement without human intervention). This includes a number of already existing 
loitering munitions and fire-and-forget systems. For example, Harpy/Harop and other 
air-to-ground loitering munitions systems homing in on radar should accordingly be 
counted as AWS, as should the UK’s Brimstone anti-tank missile when fired in lock-on 
mode.4
The adoption of the ICRC’s definition – or one like it – is strongly advisable. Con-
sistency requires forgoing the notion that AWS are mere «future weapons». Instead, 
we realize that we are already beginning to allow autonomy in critical weapon system 
functions. But more importantly, and independent of which precise terminology is 
4 Brimstone is an air-to-ground anti-tank missile. In laser-guided mode, human operators pick 
out specific targets for the missile to destroy. In lock-on mode, Brimstone is loaded with tar-
geting data, including data that serve to circumscribe the area within which it will then search 
for, select and attack – without any further intervention by human operators – armored enemy 
vehicles. Thus, Brimstone satisfies the DoD (and the ICRC) requirement for autonomy in lock-on 
mode, and fails to satisfy the same requirement in laser-guided mode. The operation mode is 
selected by human operators on the basis of available information about individual attack sce-
narios (e.g. by considering whether there are civilians or friendly forces in the vicinity of targets) 
(Boulanin/Verbruggen 2017: 48-50).
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used to define AWS, the fact remains that the continued development and potential 
widespread use of weapon systems that independently identify, select and engage 
targets raise a number of unprecedented legal, ethical and political issues, which 
urgently require a concerted response by the international community.
One definitional question that raises concerns from some nation states, including 
Germany, is the status of current weapon systems that are already capable of oper-
ating without human intervention once activated. This especially concerns SARMO 
(Sense and React to Military Objects) weapon systems, which intercept high-speed 
inanimate objects such as incoming missiles, artillery shells and mortar grenades 
(Sharkey 2014). Examples include the «Nächstbereichschutzsystem» (NBS) MANTIS, 
which is deployed by the German Bundeswehr.
Systems like MANTIS have been deemed by Human Rights Watch (HRW 2012) 
as precursors to fully autonomous weapons. Others have tried to separate them from 
fully autonomous weapons by calling them automated or automatic systems (Sauer 
2016). The US Department of Defense attempted to bound the scope of these weap-
ons by suggesting that: «The automatic system is not able to initially define the path 
according to some given goal or to choose the goal that is dictating its path» (US DoD 
2013: 66).
There are a number of common features for SARMO weapons that do in fact keep 
them distinct from those AWS that raise concerns. Ideally speaking, SARMO systems 
are:
  fully pre-programmed to automatically perform a small set of defined actions 
repeatedly and independently of external influence or control,
  used in highly structured and predictable environments that are relatively unclut-
tered with very low risk of civilian harm,
  operating from a fixed base – although some are used on naval vessels, they are 
«fixed» in the same sense as a robot arm mounted on a stationary platform on the 
same ship would be, 
  unable to dynamically initiate a new targeting goal or change mode of operation 
once activated,
  constantly evaluated and monitored by human operators for rapid shutdown in 
cases of targeting errors, change of situation or change in status of targets,
  predictable in terms of system output and behavior,
  only used defensively against direct attacks by military objects uninhabited by 
humans when time is of the essence,
  constrained by design, that is, impossible to direct at human or human-inhabited 
targets after deployment.
Insofar as SARMO systems, such as the German MANTIS, operate with these 
features listed above, their use to protect soldier’s lives is not problematic.
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There is a risk, however, that these boundaries may be overstepped. A system such as 
MANTIS might be turned into – or embedded within – a system of systems that tracks 
the location of the attackers and fires back at them without human intervention. 
This would be problematic indeed. It would raise all the legal, ethical, and political 
issues commonly connected to AWS. We will discuss this again in more depth in sec-
tion 6.
To sum up, concerns over the supposed extreme difficulty of reaching a clear defi-
nition of autonomy can be addressed by focusing the discussion on the functions of 
weapon systems, especially the critical functions of target identification and the initi-
ation of violent force, and the associated requirement for human control.
With this in mind, we turn to discussing the legal, ethical, and political implica-
tions of AWS in more detail. We organize the discussion around four questions: Can 
AWS be guaranteed to comply with International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and Inter-
national Human Rights Law (IHRL)? Is it ethical to allocate to machines the determi-
nation of when to apply violent force? What issues of accountability and responsibility 
are raised by AWS? And what will AWS mean for global security?
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2. Adherence to the principles of 
international humanitarian law 
(IHL)
Much of the discussion concerning the ethical and legal implications of AWS is about 
guaranteeing that any fielded system will comply with IHL. The guarantee of compli-
ance is problematic for a number of reasons.
2.1 The principle of distinction between civilians and combatants
As clarified by the ICRC in its codification of customary IHL, the Principle of Distinc-
tion (Rule 1) establishes that «The parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish 
between civilians and combatants. Attacks may only be directed against combatants. 
Attacks must not be directed against civilians» (ICRC 2006: 3).
It is highly doubtful that AWS will in any foreseeable future be able to discern 
between civilians and combatants, as required by IHL. This is partly attributable to the 
types of sensing capabilities available for AWS and partly because it is very difficult to 
define the notion of civilian (Sharkey 2008).
There are systems that have a weak form of distinction. For example, the already 
mentioned Israeli Harpy/Harop is a loitering munition that detects radar signals. 
When it finds one, it looks at its database to find out if it is friendly – if not, it dive-
bombs the signal’s source. This type of discrimination does not meet the criteria 
required by the Principle of Distinction because the system cannot tell if the radar is, 
for example, positioned within a military anti-aircraft installation or on the roof of a 
school.
More generally speaking, AWS lack, for the foreseeable future, the main compo-
nents required to ensure compliance with the Principle of Distinction.
AWS lack adequate sensory or vision processing systems for separating combat-
ants from civilians, particularly in insurgent warfare, or for recognizing wounded or 
surrendering combatants. AWS may be equipped with various sensors such as cam-
eras, infrared sensors, sonars, lasers, temperature sensors and lidars. But these sen-
sors and the accompanying processing systems are unable to differentiate legitimate 
from non-legitimate (human) targets, particularly from a great distance or in the fog 
of war. While a computer can compute any given procedure that can be written down 
in a programming language, for discrimination we would need a clear specification of 
«civilian-ness». This simply does not exist. We also cannot derive one from IHL (1944 
Geneva Convention and 1977 Protocol 1), at least not one that would be unambiguous 
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enough to enable a machine to make the distinction between civilians and combat-
ants. After all, even for humans this distinction can be extremely difficult to make, 
especially if an adversary does not play by the rules.
Formidable challenges are posed especially by contemporary armed conflicts 
where the distinction between combatants and protected persons is no longer based 
on easily perceivable and distinctive signs such as military uniforms, but rather on 
people’s «behaviour and actions on the battlefield» (NATO JAPCC 2016). In IHL, refer-
ence is made in particular to those cases of civilians losing protection from attacks as 
a consequence of their «direct participation in hostilities» or, in the context of non-in-
ternational armed conflicts, their performance of «continuous combat functions». 
Distinction, in other words, is embedded in the broader requirement of situational 
awareness (Suchman 2016).5 Situational awareness presupposes, in its turn, an open-
ended repertoire of in situ human discriminatory capabilities, intuitions and experi-
ence, which is not attainable by AI and robotic systems for the foreseeable future. So 
while we may eventually move machines towards having some limited sensory and 
visual discrimination capability in certain narrowly constrained circumstances, AWS 
would still lack the required understanding of context, especially in the unstructured 
and unpredictable scenarios on the battlefield, and the necessary situational aware-
ness, experience and common sense to allow for a discrimination decision.
2.2 Proportionality in attack
Under the principle of proportionality, it is forbidden to launch «an attack which may 
be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civil-
ian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the con-
crete and direct military advantage anticipated» (ICRC 2006). This principle, in other 
words, raises «the terrible and impossible problem» (Solis 2016: 293) of striking a bal-
ance between military gains expectedly deriving from some given course of action 
and harm to civilians ensuing from it (HRW 2016).
The prospect of developing AWS capable of assessing proportionality with suffi-
cient competence prior to and during an attack appears at the present to be ground-
less, insofar as proportionality analysis, like distinction, relies heavily on qualitative 
elements and open-textured standards such as the judgment of a «reasonable mili-
tary commander» (Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign 
Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 2000: para 50).
5 An Army Times article quotes US Army Chief of Staff Gen. Mark Milley speaking at the Future of 
War Conference in Washington, D.C. who comments that in future, increasingly urban, warfare 
«[s]oldiers will have to be highly trained in discriminating fire, able to quickly and effectively tell 
who is a combatant and who is a bystander … Our leaders at the pointy end of the spear are going 
to have very, very high degrees of ethical skill and resilience to be able to deal with incredibly 
intense issues in ground combat» (Myers 2017).
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2.3 The prohibition of attacks against persons hors de combat
Structurally analogous to the rule of distinction is the prohibition, stemming from the 
principle of military necessity, against attacking persons recognized as hors de combat: 
namely anyone who is defenseless because of «unconsciousness, shipwreck, wounds 
or sickness» and «anyone who clearly expresses an intention to surrender» (ICRC 
2006). The ability of AWS to ensure human-like compliance has been questioned in 
relation to this rule as well (Sparrow 2015). Indeed, the recognition of behaviors that 
convey unconventional surrender messages and fighting incapacitation poses formi-
dable challenges for AWS programmers and developers.
Note that making reference to this prohibition in the discussion of AWS is of 
particular importance: unlike the rules of distinction and proportionality, this rule 
applies to every warfare scenario in which humans are involved. It therefore counters 
the argument that IHL would not pose any obstacle to the deployment of lethal AWS 
in a variety of scenarios where civilians or civilian objects are totally absent (e.g. a bat-
tleship in the high seas; Schmitt 2013).
2.4 The unpredictability of AWS 
The nature of autonomous systems in general makes their behavior unpredictable, 
and nowhere more so than in open, unstructured environments replete with unantic-
ipated circumstances (Sharkey 2012; see also, among others, Sparrow 2007; Grut 2013; 
Geiss 2015; HRW 2015; Egeland 2016). This is particularly problematic in a scenario 
where one autonomous system interacts with another. Any AWS will be equipped with 
algorithms relating its input/sensing to its output behavior (its movement, targeting 
and application of force). These algorithms will have to remain secret: otherwise 
opponents will easily be able to counter AWS. Consequently, if two AWS or swarms 
of AWS meet, the resulting behavior of both will be impossible to model adequately 
and predict with the accuracy required by IHL compliance, with escalation being one, 
worrisome and plausible outcome, as we will argue further below in section 5. The 
unpredictability of AWS makes ex ante guarantees of IHL compliance extremely chal-
lenging, if not impossible.
2.5 The inadequacy of Article 36 reviews of AWS 
A review of new weapons, means or methods of warfare to ensure that they can 
comply with IHL is required under Article 36 of Additional Protocol 1 to the Geneva 
Convention. In reality only around 12 states actually have the necessary facility to 
conduct such reviews (Boulanin 2016). When reviews are conducted, their results are 
never made public. An additional problem for a possible review of a fully comput-
er-controlled system such as an AWS is that it is extremely difficult to formally verify 
its behavior in all circumstances (see subsection 2.4 above). There are currently no 
known methods to formally verify an autonomous system.
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What this means for AWS reviews is that the only method available to measure 
IHL compliance is empirical testing. This can only be definitive, however, if the test 
results in a negative outcome, determining that the system does not comply. This is 
the case because it is not possible to test the indeterminate and unbounded number 
of unanticipated circumstances that can occur in the use of force in conflict, so that a 
system that complies under certain circumstances may not under others.
Some authors argue that, at this stage, the possibility cannot be excluded that 
someday in the future AWS will be able to comply with IHL principles (e.g. Schmitt 
2013: 16-21; Anderson/Waxman 2017: 1109-1110). While this is correct in a very weak 
sense (how can one exclude the possibility that such goal can ever be achieved on the 
basis of an educated guess), three important clarifications are in order.
First, the «translation» of IHL principles and rules into machine algorithms (if 
something like that should ever be possible) must never be made at the cost of their 
oversimplification. This requirement is particularly significant with regard to the rule 
of proportionality. Contrary to what has been suggested (Schmitt 2013), AWS cannot 
simply be «pre-programmed» to carry out proportionality analysis on the basis of the 
assignment by human operators of a given value to each military objective (e.g. a tank 
or a military base) in terms of admissible collateral damage. After all, the proportion-
ality principle must be respected not only in the planning phases of an attack, but 
also throughout its execution. Proportionality must be continually reassessed in the 
light of the circumstances on the ground, which may well change since the attack was 
launched. Determinations of military advantage and its proportionality, in short, are 
made on a case-by-case basis in the context of a dynamically changing environment. 
Therefore, the value, in terms of acceptable collateral damages, assigned to military 
objectives cannot be determined once and for all by the commander (and even less 
by the weapon’s designers and producers). Rather, it has to be constantly adjusted to 
match the dynamic features of the environment in which the AWS has been deployed. 
This requirement is in line with the principle of precaution, whereby «[i]n the conduct 
of military operations, constant care shall be taken to spare the civilian population, 
civilians and civilian objects» (Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, Art. 
57(1), our emphasis). Should those adjustments be carried out in real time by human 
operators, weapon systems would hardly qualify as autonomous: after all, target selec-
tion and engagement would then be subject to high levels of human control. If, on 
the other hand, AWS were to be endowed with the capability to make proportionality 
assessments throughout the execution phase, their algorithms would need to be far 
more sophisticated than the pre-assigned collateral damage value envisaged above 
which, in turn, would take us back to the problems already discussed in that regard 
above (in subsections 2.1-2.3).
Second, it should have been made sufficiently clear by this point that the devel-
opment of AWS able to comply with IHL in cluttered scenarios poses formidable 
technological challenges, the solution to which is not the expected outcome of any 
existing research program (in robotics and AI). Accordingly, those who wish to claim 
that IHL-compliant AWS can be manufactured in a not-so-distant future must bear 
the formidable burden of proving the scientific basis of their contention.
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Third and finally, even if we were to assume, for the sake of the argument, that 
AWS might someday become capable of human-like performances with respect to 
adherence to IHL, AWS breaches of IHL are still possible. These persisting problems of 
accountability and responsibility are what we turn to now.
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3. Accountability and 
responsibility
An argument often raised against autonomy in weapon systems is that it is bound to 
create accountability gaps (Sparrow 2007; HRW 2015). Indeed, even some proponents 
of AWS are compelled to admit that, no matter how accurate, these systems will never 
operate completely flawlessly. Consequently, it is quite possible for an AWS to act in 
breach of IHL and even to commit acts amounting – at least materially – to war crimes. 
But then who will be personally accountable for these acts? Since AWS obviously can-
not be held responsible as direct perpetrators, responsibility for their actions should 
be traced back to some persons in the decision-making chain. But this is where the 
problems begin.
3.1 The «many hands» scenario
At the outset, one should note that the list of potentially responsible individuals 
is quite long, as it includes «the software programmer, the military commander in 
charge of the operation, the military personnel that sent the AWS into action or those 
overseeing its operation, the individual(s) who conducted the weapons review, or 
political leaders» (Wagner 2016: mn. 22; see also Heyns 2013: para. 77), as well as «the 
manufacturer of the AWS» (Jain 2016: 321-324) and «the procurement official» (Corn 
2016: 230-238). Far from facilitating the task of identifying the responsible individuals, 
this list raises the familiar «many hands» problem. This problem commonly occurs 
in software-related accidents, where while a group of people can be blamed collec-
tively for a determined outcome, it is often the case that none of them can individually 
be held responsible. To the extent that no one actually pushes the «fire» button, and 
hence assumes at least prima facie responsibility in case of wrongdoing, AWS technol-
ogy will put those involved in their use in the position to «pass the buck» to others (for 
the discussion of such a scenario see Amoroso/Tamburrini 2017: 7).
3.2 Implications of the unpredictability of AWS for accountability
An additional source of accountability problems lies in the fact that, as noted above, 
the behavior of an AWS cannot be predicted by its users. How this impacts on indi-
vidual accountability is easy to grasp. There may be uncontroversial cases, such 
as that of a machine deliberately pre-programmed to carry out war crimes, or that 
of a commander who deploys an AWS in a context different from the one that it was 
designed for, and where it subsequently «commits» war crimes. In many conceivable 
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circumstances, however, the complexities of weapon autonomy and the resulting 
behavioral unpredictability in partially structured or unstructured warfare scenarios 
are likely to afford a powerful defense against criminal prosecution. Indeed, in most 
cases it would be impossible to ascertain the existence of intent, knowledge or reck-
lessness, which is required under international criminal law (ICL) to ascribe crimi-
nal responsibility. As a consequence, it would be highly probable that no one person 
would be held criminally liable, even if the result of the military operation were to 
undeniably amount to a war crime.
3.3 Inadequacy of proposed solutions to problems of accountability/
responsibility 
None of the proposals put forth to avoid an accountability gap proves able to address 
this problem adequately. Let us analyze each of them in turn.
Command responsibility. Some have argued that no accountability gap would 
arise in relation to the use of AWS, by relying on the doctrine of «command respon-
sibility» (Schmitt 2013; NATO JACPP 2016). Under this doctrine, «[c]ommanders 
and other superiors are criminally responsible for war crimes committed by their 
subordinates if they knew, or had reason to know, that the subordinates were about 
to commit or were committing such crimes and did not take all necessary and rea-
sonable measures in their power to prevent their commission, or if such crimes had 
been committed, to punish the persons responsible» (ICRC 2006: Rule 153). On this 
basis, it is submitted, the officer who decides to deploy an AWS will be held criminally 
responsible for war crimes perpetrated by it, if she or he has failed in her or his duty 
as commander.
However, the doctrine of «command responsibility,» as it currently stands, is of 
little help in relation to weapons that select and engage targets without human inter-
vention. Let us start with observing that this doctrine is built upon the commander’s 
knowledge of the subordinate’s behavior, or at least upon its predictability. Yet, as we 
have already pointed out in subsection 2.4, there are good reasons to maintain that 
AWS may well take unforeseeable courses of action, which would make it particularly 
challenging to establish criminal responsibility.
One could object, in this respect, that human soldiers are «autonomous» as well 
(Corn 2016: 221), and can act in no less unpredictable ways than AWS, e.g. by diso-
beying orders. This would overlook, however, a number of important aspects which 
differentiate the superior-subordinates relationship from the one existing between an 
AWS and the employing commander.
First, human soldiers are subject to a continuous training process, aimed at 
instilling awareness of their obligations under IHL (Art. 87(2) I AP), which continues 
even when they are fielded into a combat scenario (Corn 2016: 222-223). An autono-
mous weapon, in contrast, could, in a legal sense, only be fielded when first deemed 
IHL-compliant. Consequently, it would have to be «trained» to respect IHL before-
hand, that is, before being used in combat scenarios. Thus, the military commander 
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would have little or no chance to influence its behavior once it is deployed on the 
battlefield (Corn 2016: 214).
Second, in case of misconduct by human soldiers, the commander may (and 
indeed must) exercise her or his punitive power over them – an option that is clearly 
precluded when the «wrongdoer» is an AWS to which «punishment» is a meaningless 
concept.
Third, as the International Criminal Court made clear, in order to establish crimi-
nal responsibility under the doctrine of «command responsibility», the «superior must 
have had effective control over the perpetrator at the time at which the superior is said 
to have failed to exercise his powers to prevent or to punish» (ICC 2009: para 418). 
This requirement is very unlikely to be satisfied in the case of AWS: after all, no longer 
having to constantly exert human «effective control» is exactly what AWS are all about, 
and in the great majority of cases their faster-than-human reaction times would make 
a commander’s intervention impossible (see section 6).
Responsibility of developers or procurement officials. Others have suggested shift-
ing the accountability focus for AWS from the deployment to the development/pro-
curement phase because, at that stage, it would still be possible to ensure that AWS 
are effectively equipped with all of the cognitive and evaluative capabilities that are 
needed to faithfully respect IHL principles. Accordingly, responsibility for AWS’ war 
crimes should primarily lie with «military procurement managers, weapons develop-
ers and legal advisors» (Corn 2016: 224). However, shifting accountability to the devel-
opment/procurement phase does not address the issues of unpredictability set out 
above (in subsection 2.4). If deployed in a dynamic environment, an AWS is capable 
of taking courses of action whose reason may be unfathomable «even to the system’s 
designers» (Crootof 2016: 1373). Under these circumstances, it seems highly unlikely 
that those involved in the procurement/development phase could effectively be held 
responsible.
Opaque recklessness. Another proposal to avoid AWS-related accountability gaps 
is to lower the mens rea threshold, by introducing opaque recklessness as a culpable 
state of mind in relation to AWS-related war crimes. Under this provision, the defend-
ant would act with recklessness only where he or she «knows his or her conduct is 
risky but either fails to realize or consciously disregards the specific reasons for the 
riskiness» (Jain 2016: 317). This would in fact allow holding the commander/field 
officer/deploying soldier criminally accountable for AWS war crimes, even if she or he 
was «unaware of the exact risk of harm posed by the AWS’s conduct» and even if the 
latter’s actions were «uncertain and unpredictable,» provided that she or he was aware 
that there was «a substantial and unjustified risk» of some unspecified «dangerous 
occurrence» (Jain 2016: 318).
The problem with this proposal and others like it is that in dealing with account-
ability issues, one should always take care not to confuse the fight against impunity 
with «scapegoat[ing] proximate human beings» (Liu 2016: 341). To the extent that the 
notion of opaque recklessness stretches culpability to the outer limits of strict liability, 
it risks the substitution of scapegoating for accountability.
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Collective responsibility (State responsibility and corporate product liability). A last 
attempt to fill AWS-related accountability gaps relies on existing forms of collective 
responsibility for wrongful acts, namely State responsibility (e.g. Hammond 2015) and 
corporate product liability (NATO JAPCC 2016: 29-30). This proposal is largely unsat-
isfactory in that it fails to provide an adequate legal response to serious violations of 
international law such as war crimes (Chengeta 2016: 49-50). It should be recalled, in 
this respect, that in any legal system individual criminal responsibility performs a cru-
cial, two-fold function. On the one hand, the threat of a punishment deters individuals 
from committing crimes (deterrent function); on the other hand, the actual imposi-
tion of a criminal sanction provides an adequate retribution to the offender for the 
harm done (retributive function). Both functions cannot be performed in the same 
way by collective responsibility, for the well-known reason that international crimes 
«are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals 
who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced» (Inter-
national Military Tribunal Nuremberg 1946: 447).
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4. Human dignity, humanity, and 
public conscience
At a more general level, the process of «dehumanization» of the use of force repre-
sented by the development of lethal AWS has been variously stigmatized. This point 
his has been made on the basis of the principle of human dignity and of the Martens 
Clause.
4.1 Human dignity
Some have claimed that autonomy in lethal weapon systems would run contrary to 
the principle of human dignity (ICRC 2018: 2). This claim is more far-reaching than the 
previous ones, as it is built upon a principle that is both foundational and open-tex-
tured in ethical and legal contexts alike. Indeed, the former Special Rapporteur on 
Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns, characterized the 
appeal to human dignity as «an overriding consideration,» which would justify a ban 
on «the deployment of [fully autonomous weapons], no matter the level of technical 
competence at which they operate» (Heyns 2013: 17). In an oft-quoted passage of his 
Report on Lethal Autonomous Robotics, Heyns condensed the reasons for this con-
clusion as follows: «[m]achines lack morality and mortality, and should as a result not 
have life and death powers over humans» (Heyns 2013: 17).
More analytically, it is possible to distinguish two arguments supporting this view, 
one of which is centered on agent-relative duties, and the other one on patient-rela-
tive rights. The first variant moves from the assumption that the action of suppressing 
a human life is legally justifiable only if it is non-arbitrary, namely it is based on a 
considered and informed decision. In order to be non-arbitrary (and here is where 
the principles of humanity come in), the act of killing must be grounded on human 
judgement, for only human decision-making guarantees the full appreciation of «the 
value of individual life [and] the significance of its loss» (HRW 2014: 3). According 
to the second variant, human dignity would be blatantly denied if people were sub-
ject to robotic lethal decision-making, because this would place them in a position 
where they «have no avenue, futile or not, of appealing to the humanity of the enemy» 
(Heyns 2017: 156). Indeed, the decision to kill or not would be taken on the basis of 
hypotheticals set in advance in the AWS programming phase, or developed by the 
machine itself as rules of behavior extrapolated from its past experience. The ensuing 
life-or-death decision could, by definition, not be overridden when the AWS is actu-
ally releasing force, with the consequence that the human target would essentially be 
written off without (even the slightest) hope of changing her or his fate.
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The upshot of both variants of this argument is that respect for human dignity 
affords a distinctive moral reason to forbid the use of AWS, which cannot be overrid-
den by any envisaged technological developments that may occur in the future, even 
by technological developments that might lead to improved performances in AWS’s 
critical targeting and engagement functions. More generally speaking, violations of 
human dignity cannot be justified by appeal to any other allegedly good consequence 
deriving from their perpetrations.
This line of ethical and legal reasoning strongly resonates with the basic principle 
of the inviolability of human dignity as enshrined in Germany’s basic law («Grundg-
esetz») Article 1 (1). It is notably exemplified in a 2006 decision of the German Con-
stitutional Court. The Court ruled that the Defense Minister cannot order the German 
Air Force («Luftwaffe») to shoot down a hijacked passenger airplane even when there 
is evidence that the airplane will be used by hijackers as a weapon to kill people on the 
ground. The basis for this decision was in fact «Grundgesetz» Article 1 (1). According 
to the Court, by shooting down the hijacked airplane, the State would treat its passen-
gers as mere objects and not as persons, as instruments to achieve some admittedly 
worthy goal (i.e., saving the life of other people on the ground). By doing so, however, 
the State would not recognize the special worth as human beings of the airplane pas-
sengers, thereby violating their dignity (Bundesverfassungsgericht 2006).
4.2 The Martens Clause
The Martens Clause made its first appearance in international legal parlance in 1899, 
when it was inserted – on the proposal of the Russian publicist Fyodor Fyodorovich 
Martens (from whom it takes its name) – in the Preamble of the Second Hague Con-
vention containing the Regulations on the Laws and Customs of War on Land. Sub-
sequently incorporated into a number of IHL treaties (including in the Preamble to 
the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons), in its modern formulation the 
Martens Clause states that, absent any specific regulation, «the civilian population 
and the combatants shall at all times remain under the protection and authority of the 
principles of international law derived from established custom, from the principles 
of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience» (CCW 2001: Fifth Preambular 
paragraph).
In relation to AWS, the Martens Clause has been invoked to contend that the 
deployment of weapon systems enabled to take life-or-death decisions without human 
supervision would run contrary to both ‹the principles of humanity› and ‹the dictates 
of public conscience› (most recently: Sparrow 2017). As the HRW- report pointed out: 
«The Blinding Lasers Protocol set an international precedent for preemptively ban-
ning weapons based, at least in part, on the Martens Clause. Invoking the clause in the 
context of fully autonomous weapons would be equally appropriate» (HRW 2016: 17).
Reliance on the «principles of humanity» aligns with the view that AWS would 
be prohibited under the principle of human dignity (see subsection 4.1 above). The 
«dictates of public conscience» prong of the Martens Clause, however, adds a valua-
ble new element, in that it grounds the abstract concepts of «humanity» and «human 
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dignity» in the reactions of the international community to certain means and meth-
ods of warfare.
Admittedly, this prong of the Clause is the more controversial one, as it is far from 
certain whose conscience should be taken into consideration and how it would be 
queried. Nevertheless, the idea that machines should not take life-or-death decisions 
has been gaining consensus within the international community at large. Evidence of 
this may be found, in particular, in the declarations rendered by States at the Human 
Rights Council in reaction to the presentation of the Heyns’ Report on LAWS (Cam-
paign to Stop Killer Robots 2013), at the UN General Assembly First Committee on 
Disarmament and International Security (Campaign to Stop Killer Robots 2018), 
and during the CCW Informal Meetings of Experts (Lewis/Blum/Modirzadeh 2016: 
Appendix); in parliamentary initiatives specifically addressing this matter;6 in reports 
issued by international human rights supervisory bodies (Heyns 2013; African Com-
mission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 2015, para. 35; Kiai/Heyns 2016); in the (qual-
ified) criticism voiced in the aforementioned Open Letters signed in 2015 and 2017, 
respectively, by renowned experts in the fields of robotics and Artificial Intelligence 
(AI) and by founders and CEOs of AI and robotics companies; as well as in opinion 
surveys showing a spreading hostility to non-human lethal decision-making (Ipsos 
2017) (especially – and this seems worthy of note – among members of the armed 
forces).7 While it would be highly speculative to draw any final conclusions, there is 
clear evidence for an emerging global norm against weapon autonomy.
6 These include a resolution of the European Parliament (2014) calling on «the High Represent-
ative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Member States and the Council to: […] (d) ban 
the development, production and use of fully autonomous weapons which enable strikes to be 
carried out without human intervention». For other parliamentary initiatives, see Campaign to 
Stop Killer Robots (2017).
7 This is evidenced, in particular, in a survey conducted by YouGov America on the US public 
(Carpenter 2013a; 2013b; see also Openroboethics 2015 for a globally conducted online survey 
which underlines these results; cf. Horowitz 2016 for a critical perspective).
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5. Global security and stability
A criticism commonly levelled against advocates of a ban on AWS is that they ignore 
the positive impact that autonomy in weapon systems could have on the protection 
of innocent civilians, and the respect for IHL in general. Would it not be beneficial, 
it is asked, if AWS were to become more accurate than human soldiers in targeting 
military objectives? After all, unlike human soldiers, the argument continues, AWS are 
utterly unconstrained by the need for self-preservation and immune from human pas-
sions (such as anger, fear and vengefulness) (Arkin 2013: 2; Schmitt 2013: 23; Sassòli 
2014: 310; Anderson/Waxman 2017: 1108).
We judge the argument about the immunity to human passions a misleading 
anthropomorphic view of weapon systems. But if we were for a moment, and for the 
sake of the argument, to say that AWS would in fact be immune to anger, fear and 
vengefulness, then they would be equally immune to comradery, empathy and 
compassion. Consequently, such notions are best left aside. The remaining part of 
the overall argument is the possibly improved protection of innocent civilians. Our 
in-depth discussion (in section 2) of the very low likelihood that AWS can be com-
pliant with IHL weakens this line of argument from the get go. Nevertheless, let us 
assume – again, for the sake of argument – that a future deployment of AWS might 
reduce casualties among belligerents and non-belligerents in a restricted battlefield 
scenario.
This line of argument is a narrow appraisal that only captures a fraction of the 
overall picture. It screens off more pervasive effects that are likely to flow from an 
increased use of AWS. A balanced assessment of expected costs and benefits, in con-
trast, requires one to take into account the wider landscape of geopolitical implica-
tions. Such a more realistic, broader approach would take into account, in addition 
to local battlefield implications, expected geopolitical consequences of AWS deploy-
ment, which range from proliferation to regional and global instabilities and unin-
tended escalation of conflicts. In this wider context, as we shall see below, the 
expected costs of AWS deployment outweigh by far their alleged benefits in restricted 
battlefield scenarios.8
8 The following paragraphs draw heavily on Altmann/Sauer 2017. See also Tamburrini 2016 for the 
related distinction between narrow and wide appraisals of the consequences of AWS produc-
tion, deployment and use. 
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5.1 Proliferation and arms races
AWS need not take the shape of one specific weapon system, for example a drone 
or a missile. AWS also do not require a specific military technology development 
path, in the way that, for example, nuclear weapons do. As the underlying tech-
nologies mature and begin to pervade the civilian sphere, militaries will be able to 
increasingly make use of them for their own purposes, as the development of infor-
mation and communication technology as a whole suggests. Clearly, as with other 
military adaptations of dual-use technologies, there are many specific military 
requirements that do not exist in a civilian environment, or are less relevant for 
mass markets. Nevertheless, AWS development will profit from the implementation 
or mirroring of a variety of civilian technologies (or derivatives thereof ) and their 
adoption for military purposes – technologies which are currently either already 
available or on the cusp of becoming ready for series production in the commercial 
sector – in this way continuing a trend that is already observable in armed drones. 
It is fair to say that the autonomy arms race is already underway. In contrast to arms 
races of the past, however, research and development for AWS-relevant technology is 
distributed over countless defense contractors, university laboratories and commer-
cial enterprises, making use of economies of scale and the forces of the market to spur 
competition, lower prices and shorten innovation cycles. This renders the military 
research and development effort in the case of AWS quite different from those of past 
hi-tech conventional weapon systems, let alone nuclear weapons. So while the impact 
of AWS might be revolutionary in terms of the implications for warfare, their develop-
ment within the military is rather accelerating an already existing trend to replace labor 
with capital, automate «dull, dirty and dangerous» tasks, and leverage AI for military 
purposes more generally.9 Compared to nuclear weapons and the past efforts to curb 
nuclear arms races and proliferation, moreover, AWS are easy to obtain and harder to 
regulate, their proliferation more difficult to control.10 They don’t require ores, centri-
fuges, high-speed fuses or other comparably «exotic» components, put together and 
tested in a clandestine manner. Consequently, there are comparatively few choke-
points for non-proliferation policies to set their sights on, which renders AWS poten-
tially available to a wide range of state and non-state actors, not just nation states able 
and determined to muster up the considerable resources required to conduct the 
robotic equivalent of a Manhattan program. This is why arms control with regard to 
AWS cannot rely on traditional, quantitative measures but rather requires establish-
ing a norm for meaningful human control. We return to discuss this further below. 
The less scrupulous an actor is about IHL compliance, the easier AWS development 
gets. Comparably crude AWS, those not living up to the standards of a professional 
9 See, in connection to this, a recently compiled dataset on the developing role of artificial intelli-
gence in weapon systems (Roff/Moyes 2016; Roff 2016).
10 This was also pinpointed by the drafters of the Future of Life Institute (2015) Open Letter, 
who underscored that «[u]nlike nuclear weapons, [AWS] require no costly or hard-to-obtain 
raw materials, so they will become ubiquitous and cheap for all significant military powers to 
mass-produce», rendering them the «the Kalashnikovs of tomorrow».
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military, could be put together with technology available today by less technologi-
cally advanced state actors or even non-state actors. After all, converting a remotely 
controlled combat drone to autonomously fire a weapon in response to a simple 
pattern-recognizing algorithm’s command is already doable. It is, at the same time, 
unlikely that the technological edge regarding sophisticated AWS, desired especially 
by the US, can be kept over a longer term. The US officially declared AI and robot-
ics the cornerstones of its new «third offset» strategy to counter rising powers, with 
former Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter seeking closer ties with Silicon Valley to 
hasten the incorporation of technological innovations into the US military (Hagel 
2014; Lamothe 2016). While sensor and weapon packages to a large degree deter-
mine the overall capabilities of a system, implementing autonomy comes down 
to software alone. Software can easily be replicated; at the same time, it is also at a 
unique risk of being stolen via computer network operations. So while the devel-
opment of AWS clearly presents a larger technical challenge to less technologically 
advanced actors, obtaining AWS with at least a noteworthy military capability is cer-
tainly not a distant goal for any country already developing remotely controlled UAVs. 
Proliferation of AWS would of course also occur via exports, including gray and 
black ones. AWS could in this way fall not only into the hands of less technologically 
advanced state actors, but also into those of non-state actors, including extrem-
ist groups. Hamas, Hezbollah and the Islamic State are examples of three non-state 
actors that already have deployed and used armed drones. With the increasing trend 
to miniaturize sensors, electronics and autonomy coming down to software, small 
and easily transportable systems can be made autonomous with respect to naviga-
tion, target recognition, precision and unusual modes of attack. Terrorist groups 
could also get access to comparably sophisticated systems that they could never 
develop on their own. Again, autonomy here does not necessarily have to be mili-
tary-grade but can follow a «quick and dirty» approach. In fact, it stands to reason 
that terrorist groups would use autonomous killing capabilities indiscriminately 
as well as, if available to them, in a precise fashion for targeted assassinations.11 
As of yet, it is still unclear how the development of unmanned systems on the one 
hand, and specific countermeasures on the other will play out. Traditional-air-
craft-sized drones such as the US’s X-47B testbed or the British prototype Taranis are 
obviously susceptible to already existing anti-aircraft systems. Regarding smaller-sized 
systems, various avenues, from microwaves to lasers to rifle-sized radio jammers for 
disrupting the control link, are currently being developed as countermeasures. Sim-
pler, less exotic methods such as nets, fences or even trained hunting birds might also 
have an effect – for remotely controlled and autonomous systems alike.
What is quite clear, however, is that saturation attacks have been identified as a 
key future capability for defeating a wide range of existing and upcoming defensive 
systems – human operated and also automatic ones (Scharre 2016). And it is espe-
cially with regard to the latter that swarming is currently being intensively researched 
11 A scenario of rampant AWS proliferation is depicted in the video «Slaughterbots», see YouTube 
or autonomousweapons.org.
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as the key solution. But military systems operating at very high speeds and in great 
numbers or swarms are bound to generate specific new instabilities, to which we turn 
now.
5.2 Instability and (unintended) escalation
The case of SARMO systems demonstrates that as a result of increasing operational 
speeds, the human involvement in AWS would eventually be limited to, at best, general 
oversight. Hence the actions and reactions of individual AWS as well as AWS swarms12 
would have to be controlled autonomously by software. After all, «winning in swarm 
combat may depend upon having the best algorithms to enable better coordination 
and faster reaction times, rather than simply the best platforms» (Scharre 2015). 
With swarms deployed in close proximity to each other, control software would have 
to react to signs of an attack within a very short, split-second timeframe by evading or, 
possibly counter-attacking in a «use-them-or-lose-them» situation. Indications of an 
attack – a sun glint interpreted as a rocket flame, sudden and unexpected moves of the 
adversary, or a simple malfunction – could trigger escalation. As already discussed in 
subsection 2.4, interactions among autonomous systems only increase AWS-inherent 
unpredictability and are associated with a higher probability of an escalation from cri-
sis to war or, within armed conflict, to higher levels of violence. Comparable runaway 
interactions between algorithms are empirically observable already. Most famously, 
considerable havoc was caused in the New York Stock-Exchange «flash crash» of 6 May 
2010 in which computerized high-frequency trade played an essential role. Within 
minutes the prices of many equity products fell by nearly 6%, stock indices and impor-
tant industry stocks collapsed. In this case «circuit breakers» of the monitoring author-
ities set in, suspending high-speed trading and preventing further avalanche effects, 
with fast recovery. These oversight and intervention mechanisms have been improved 
since then, but debate continues as to whether they are sufficient to prevent another 
big flash crash, and mini-crashes and interventions occur daily (Shorter/Miller 2014). 
Humans – or fast reaction mechanisms put in place by humans – can act as a fail-
safe in the stock-exchange case because, unlike in international politics, there is 
human oversight as well as an overarching authority enforcing a shared set of rules. 
During the Cold War’s superpower standoff and afterwards, several well documented 
instances of erroneous indications of nuclear attack occurred in the US as well as the 
USSR (Sagan 1993; Blair 1993: Rosenbaum 2011; Schlosser 2013). They varied from 
sunlight reflected off clouds to magnetic training tapes fed into the early-warning sys-
tem by accident. In all of these cases human reasoning led to restraint instead of esca-
lation; double checks ended up revealing that the alarm had been false. At the time, 
12 In AI and robotics, a swarm intelligence system consists of a population of agents which interact 
locally with each other on the basis of relatively simple rules of behavior. Swarms do not rely on 
any centralized control structure. Rather, the global behavior of the swarm results from the com-
position of the simple local interactions between its members. The principles of swarm AI and 
swarm robotics were originally inspired by the organization and behavior of biological systems 
such as ant colonies, bird flocks, and fish schools.
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double checking and reconsidering was possible due to missile flight times between 
several hours (in the case of bombers and cruise missiles) and 30 minutes down to 
10 minutes (for ballistic missiles covering intercontinental ranges, or launched from 
submarines), as well as due to systems put in place for preventing unwanted crisis 
escalation, with the «hot line» for communication between Moscow and Washington 
established after the Cuban Missile Crisis being the most prominent example. But 
with full weapon system autonomy, tried and tested mechanisms for double check-
ing and reconsidering, with humans functioning as fail-safes or circuit-breakers, 
would be discontinued. This, in combination with unforeseeable algorithm interac-
tions and thus unforeseeable outcomes of military confrontations, increases crisis 
instability and is unpleasantly reminiscent of Cold War scenarios of «accidental war». 
Along with the increasing risk of unintended escalation, AWS are bound to introduce 
stronger incentives for premeditated (including surprise) attacks. This is due to a com-
bination of three factors: casualty avoidance, cost reduction, and the implications of 
weapon swarming. 
First, while unmanned systems, generally speaking, keep soldiers out of harm’s 
way, they also reduce the political risk of military endeavours (especially in democra-
cies where public opinion is a concern). The current generation of remotely controlled 
combat drones are a case in point. They already make it easier and less costly for states 
to infringe on the territories of other states. This trend will only intensify with faster, 
smaller, stealthy and, eventually, autonomous unmanned systems.
Second, AWS need not necessarily be big, costly high-tech weapon systems. 
Instead, they can be cheap and disposable, 3D-printed units gaining strength from 
numbers, their «intelligence» residing in a distributed fashion in the swarm or, if out-
side communication is an option, at some higher level within the military «system of 
systems» at large.
Third, and in close connection to that, swarms would make mounting a success-
ful defense especially difficult due to their resilience and their capability of attacking 
from many directions simultaneously in an overwhelming fashion.13 Small and very 
small AWS (those sized in the range of centimeters to tens of centimeters) would suf-
fer from limited power supply on board, but could be brought closer to the target by 
riding along on «motherships». While with payloads of grams to hundreds of grams 
the amount of destructive power would be limited for small and very small drones, 
if directed at political or military leadership or sensitive military infrastructure they 
could produce targeted damage and provide entirely new means for assassinations.
The combination of these three factors – with autonomous swarms as the new, 
hard-to-defend-against capability – presents a strong incentive to seize the advantage 
of being the first on the offensive. Swarms of AWS could also be used to attack nuclear 
weapon delivery systems, command and control systems and sensitive infrastruc-
ture components such as antennas, sensors or air intakes. Even though an attacker 
13 It is worth mentioning in that regard that swarms inherently represent a challenge to human 
supervision and control because a human would never be able to control every single attack but 
can at best supervise «on the loop» what the swarm in its entirety is doing.
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could actually have little interest and confidence in the success of such a disarming 
first strike, the novel possibility alone would increase nervousness between nuclear 
armed adversaries.
Moreover, AWS will likely continue and intensify the trend towards overlap 
between conventional and nuclear arsenals, not least by opening up new possibilities 
for tracking and holding nuclear submarines carrying sea launched ballistic missiles 
at risk (Brixey-Williams 2016).14 When nuclear weapons or strategic command and 
control systems are, or are perceived to be, put at greater risk, such new conventional 
capabilities end up increasing instability at the global, strategic level. 
In sum, today’s unmanned systems already increase the risk that military force 
is used in scenarios where manned systems would previously have presented deci-
sion-makers with bigger, caution-inducing hurdles – a connection recently also 
confirmed in war gaming exercises (CNAS 2016). Swarming AWS need not lead to 
escalation necessarily and under all conditions, of course. In asymmetric settings, 
against adversaries lacking AWS capabilities, the escalatory mechanisms developed 
above would not take effect. But in symmetric settings, they would certainly exac-
erbate the overall development toward an increased risk of crisis instability and 
escalation.
After weighing the overall costs and benefits of a possible deployment of AWS, 
opting for a ban on AWS appears tantamount to choosing the collective rule of behav-
ior that is most consistent with the maintenance of security and stability in a global 
geopolitical context (Tamburrini 2016: 137-141).
14 For the destabilizing effects on deterrence it is not relevant if the autonomous underwater vehi-
cles are armed themselves or whether they just serve to localize and track enemy submarines for 
them to be attacked by other weapons.
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6. Safeguarding human control 
over and responsibility for 
targeting decisions
The considerations in this report so far provide a wide variety of substantive reasons 
supporting public statements made by nation states such as Germany, but also the 
United Kingdom and the United States, that there should and will always be a «human 
in the loop» for all lethality decisions. 
In the United Kingdom, the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, Lord Astor of 
Hever (as cited in Sharkey 2016: 25), has stated that: «[T]he MoD [Ministry of Defense] 
currently has no intention of developing systems that operate without human inter-
vention […] let us be absolutely clear that the operation of weapon systems will always 
– always – be under human control».15 In the US’s (US DoD 2017: 2) policy on autono-
mous weapons, the authors state: «Autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon sys-
tems shall be designed to allow commanders and operators to exercise appropriate 
levels of human judgment over the use of force». 
Germany has stated at the CCW in Geneva that «the red line leading to 
weapon systems taking autonomous decisions over life and death without 
any possibility for a human intervention in the selection and engagement of 
targets should not be crossed,» adding that Germany «will not accept that the 
decision to use force, in particular the decision over life and death, is taken 
solely by an autonomous system» (Federal Republic of Germany 2015). 
A slightly different approach has been taken by the Dutch parliament in discussing a 
«wider loop» for AWS where humans will be involved in planning attacks before the 
AWS is launched (AIV/CAVV 2015: chapter 4). 
What has not been made absolutely clear in the United Kingdom, however, is 
exactly what type of human control will be employed. Nor has the US DoD made any 
attempt to define what is meant by «appropriate levels of human judgment.» Without 
15 See also, more recently, the UK’s Joint Doctrine Publication JDP 0-30.2 (UK Ministry of Defense 
2017: 43, para. 4.18): «The UK Government’s policy is clear that the operation of UK weapons 
will always be under human control as an absolute guarantee of human oversight, authority and 
accountability. Whilst weapon systems may operate in automatic modes there is always a person 
involved in setting appropriate parameters».
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addressing these points there is no transparency in the operation of computerized 
weapons.16 To say that there is a human in the control loop does not clarify the degree 
of human involvement.17 It could simply mean that a human has programmed the 
weapon system for a mission or that a button has been pressed to activate it. It does 
not necessarily mean that human judgment will be exercised in determining the legit-
imacy of targets before initiating any individual attack.
The UK-based NGO Article 36 (2014: 2) observes that «[t]he exercise of control 
over the use of weapons, and concomitant responsibility and accountability for con-
sequences are fundamental to the governance of the use of force and to the protection 
of the human person.» In the context of the deliberations of the CCW, they have called 
for an analysis of how meaningful human control is exercised over existing weapon 
systems, as a basis for assessing the feasibility of extending those protocols to AWS.
We can elaborate the requirements for human control of computerized weapon 
systems through an examination of existing research on human supervisory con-
trol. This allows for the development of a classification system such as the five lev-
els of control shown below. These levels should not be taken as absolutes, but rather 
as a basis for discussion and an initial effort towards the development of a common 
understanding for all stakeholders (Sharkey 2014; 2016).
Table 1: A classification for levels of human supervisory control of weapons18
1. human deliberates about a target before initiating any and every attack
2. software provides a list of targets and human chooses which to attack
3. software selects target and human must approve before attack
4. software selects target and human has restricted time to veto
5. software selects target and initiates attack without human involvement
The importance of the precautionary principle cannot be overstressed in the case of 
what is referred to as «supervised autonomy». It is thus essential that we avoid the 
erosion of human involvement and insist upon the legal principle of human control.
An example of the danger of such an erosion can be discussed by using the exten-
sion of a SARMO system (such as the German NBS MANTIS or its future derivatives). 
SARMO systems typically use the speed and trajectory of an incoming munition to 
calculate where to fire intercepting projectiles (or directed energy) into its path. 
16 See Knuckey (2016) for a detailed discussion about transparency. 
17 See Saxon (2016) for an excellent analysis of the problems and the vagueness of the DoD’s Direc-
tive 3000.09.
18 This simple table is adapted from early work on general (non-military) supervised control with 
ten levels of human supervisory control by Sheridan/Verplank (1978). We discuss these levels 
and their importance for an understanding of what meaningful human control of weapon sys-
tems comprises in detail below. 
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However, it is a reasonable assumption that such (future) systems would also be capa-
ble of locating the source of the incoming fire. Clearly, all that can be detected from 
the speed and trajectory of the incoming munitions is from where they were fired. It 
should not be assumed that the assailants are present at that exact location. It is possi-
ble, for example, that the incoming munition – such as a mortar – was set in a civilian 
urban area and fired by remote control. Yet, the information generated by the SARMO 
system could be used to automatically and almost instantaneously counter-attack the 
area from where the munitions were launched (with another military asset). This is 
an obvious and technically feasible extension – but still it needs to be ruled out. After 
all, it would mean stepping outside of SARMO functionality, as detailed in section 1 
above. In other words, the generated information can certainly be useful – but it would 
have to first be made available to a human commander to assess whether or not there 
are legitimate targets at the designated spot, whether or not an attack on them would 
be required by military necessity and what would be the proportionate response.
SARMO weapon systems may be operated with human control and supervision 
most of the time (in fact, the German MANTIS is said to routinely operate on level 
3, with a human approving every attack), but they (or at least many of them) are rea-
sonably placed at level 5 in the hierarchy developed above due to their capability to 
operate autonomously. Indeed, if push comes to shove humans hardly ever have a 
sufficient time frame available to veto SARMO actions, as required at level 4. In this 
respect, the possibility of shutting down SARMO-type systems when human operators 
realize that something is going, or might soon go, wrong falls short of exercising a veto 
power on each individual attack. We will return to SARMO systems as a «level 5 excep-
tion» to the rule below.
Given the technical, legal, moral and security challenges for the fielding of auton-
omous weapon systems, it should be clear that meaningful human control of weapons 
should be the goal of all nation states. In section 1 we proposed that talking about lev-
els of autonomy of weapons both complicated and confused the way forward. A useful 
reframing is thus to discuss the issues in terms of the types of human control required 
to conform to international law.
Having fleshed out the importance of human control, we now turn to a fuller dis-
cussion of the levels of human control outlined in Table 1 above, as a basis for assess-
ing the compliance of existing and proposed AWS with both IHL and IHRL.
Level 1: A human deliberates about the target before initiating any and every attack
While this level of human control is difficult in many circumstances, it is critically 
important to aim for the ideal of adhering to the strict requirements specified in Level 
1 whenever possible. A human commander (or operator) must have contextual and 
situational awareness of the target area at the time of a specific attack and be able 
to perceive and react to any change or unanticipated situations that may have arisen 
since planning the attack. There must be active deliberative participation in the 
attack and sufficient time for judgement on the nature of the target, its significance in 
terms of the necessity and proportionality of attack, and the likely effects of the attack 
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beyond engagement with its target. There must also be a means for the rapid suspen-
sion or abortion of the attack.
Level 2: Software provides a list of targets and a human chooses which to attack
This type of control could be acceptable if a human in control of an attack was in a 
position to assess whether an attack is necessary and proportional, whether all (or 
indeed any) of the suggested alternatives are permissible objects of attack, and which 
target may be expected to cause the least civilian harm. Without sufficient time or in 
a distracting environment, the illegitimacy of a target could be overlooked. A rank 
ordered list of targets is particularly problematic as there would be a tendency to 
accept the top ranked target unless sufficient time and attentional space is given for 
deliberative reasoning.
Level 3: Software selects the target and a human must approve it before the attack
This type of control has been experimentally shown to create what is known as auto-
mation bias or complacency, in which human operators come to accept comput-
er-generated solutions as correct and disregard, or do not search for, contradictory 
information. For example, in an experiment on the control of Tomahawk missiles, 
Cummings (2004) found that operators working under Level 3 had a significantly 
decreased accuracy when computer recommendations were wrong compared to 
operators working under Level 2. Decades of experience with the PATRIOT missile 
defense system confirm this finding (Hawley 2017).
Level 4: Software selects the target and the human has restricted time to veto
This option is unacceptable because it does not require human target identification. 
Providing only a short time to veto reinforces Level 3 automation bias and leaves no 
room for doubt or deliberation. As the attack will take place unless a human inter-
venes, this undermines well-established presumptions under international humani-
tarian law that promote civilian protection.19
Level 5: Software selects the targets and initiates attacks without human 
involvement
From our earlier arguments, it should be clear that weapon systems controlled at Level 
5 are unacceptable, except in the very narrowly bounded circumstance of SARMO. 
The acceptance of SARMO systems is contingent on the limitations of the system’s 
targeting, that is, it only targeting unambiguously materiel (munitions) if there is no 
time for human intervention. In addition, the SARMO system has to be constrained 
by design, that is, it must be near to impossible to tinker with it in the field to make it 
fire on other targets. It is also essential that utmost vigilance is maintained during the 
19 A cautionary tale regarding the errors connected to level 4 control is the 2003 Iraq war in which 
a US Army PATRIOT missile defense system engaged in fratricide, shooting down a British Tor-
nado and two US F/A-18, killing the pilots (Cummings 2006).
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system’s operation and that there is a means for rapidly deactivating it if required (see 
the list of SARMO features in section 1).
This classification of levels of human control is just a beginning. We need to map out 
exactly the role that the human commander/supervisor plays for each supervised 
weapon system. Research is urgently needed to ensure that human supervisory inter-
faces allow the level of human reasoning needed to comply with the laws of war in all 
circumstances (similarly: Santoni de Sio/van den Hoven 2018).
It is important to underline that, with regard to a possible legally binding 
instrument to ban AWS – that is, weapons that are not under effective human 
control – SARMO systems specifically could be allowed to preserve their form 
of reactive autonomy (and to admit a refined level 5 in the human control 
hierarchy set out above) even in light of the best ethical and legal arguments 
against AWS generally.
In turn, however, other AWS should be prohibited (and submitted to human control 
at a minimum of level 3).
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7. Summary
The world’s governments are at a crucial juncture with respect to the automation of 
weapon systems. Further automation is put forward by proponents of AWS as the 
technological solution to problems created by the increasing speed of war fighting, 
itself a function of previous waves of automation. A majority of governments and 
numerous civil society actors are calling for an interruption of this trajectory, based 
on the proposition that these emerging weapon systems pose fundamental threats to 
the international norms and to both moral/ethical and legal frameworks governing 
the conduct of war and the use of violent force.
Our working definition of autonomous weapon systems, in accordance with defi-
nitions provided by ICRC and the US Department of Defense, calls out the critical 
functions of target selection and the application of force. At the same time, we found 
it useful to reframe the issue in terms of human supervisory control. This enables 
us to more closely examine their governance and tease out what exactly is meant by 
notions such as «appropriate levels of human judgement», «human oversight», or 
even «human in» or «on the loop». It is thus the (meaningful) human supervisory con-
trol over critical functions that must be subject to careful scrutiny with respect to the 
legal, technical, moral/ethical, and security implications of AWS development.
Legally, all existing evidence indicates that the deployment of AWS could not 
comply with International Humanitarian Law for at least the foreseeable future, and 
that they pose as yet unresolved problems regarding accountability and responsibility 
for the use of violent force.
Technically, autonomous weapons lack the necessary components to ensure com-
pliance with the IHL requirements of distinction and proportionality. Their behav-
ior is inherently unpredictable, particularly in scenarios where multiple AWS would 
interact. 
Morally, the guiding principle of respect for human dignity, enshrined in Ger-
man basic law («Grundgesetz») Article 1 (1) as well as in International Human Rights 
Law, dictates that machines should not be making life or death decisions regarding 
humans. 
IHL, as well as wider public sentiment, underwrites the moral argument that the 
authority to use lethal force cannot be legitimately delegated to a machine, but rather 
must remain the responsibility of an accountable human with the duty to make a con-
sidered decision regarding necessity and proportionality in the use of force. 
In terms of global security, the development of AWS poses serious dangers for 
regional and global stability and provides incentives for their proliferation, including 
their use by actors not accountable to legal frameworks governing the use of force, as 
well as their prospective use in civilian settings for policing and the suppression of 
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unintended escalation of violent conflict.
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Recommendations
The last two coalition treaties negotiated by Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and 
Social Democrats (SPD) both pledged that the German government will work toward 
a ban on AWS at the international level (Bundesregierung 2013: 124; 2018: 149). In 
accordance with that, Germany has been playing a positive and productive role in the 
diplomatic deliberations at the CCW in Geneva, inter alia by chairing the last informal 
meeting of experts in April 2016, by convening a panel of international experts in Ber-
lin to advise the deliberation process (iPRAW 2017), and by presenting a joint paper 
with France presented at the CCW’s first Group of Governmental Experts Meeting in 
November of 2017 (France and Germany 2017).
The overall slow diplomatic progress at the CCW in Geneva, however, means that 
the onus rests on national policies more than ever. But while the US, the UK and the 
Netherlands, to name just three examples, have introduced national policies on the 
military use of autonomy in weapon systems, Germany has yet to formulate its own 
doctrine on AWS. Against this background, and recognizing the fact that diplomacy 
and policy-making risk being outpaced by the speed of military technology develop-
ment, the time to move is now.
In addition, the AWS debate is comparably young and characterized by the fact 
that the international debate and national policy-making processes are still in their 
infancy and closely intertwined; in other words, by establishing norms, national 
policies can inform, and to a considerable degree steer, the course of the ongoing 
international arms control debate in Geneva. There is ample room for courageous 
policy-making aimed at taking a leading role and staking out the territory of future 
debates. Germany should view this – and seize this – as an opportunity to live up to its 
grown international responsibilities.
Our summary recommendation, in accordance with the ICRC and other interna-
tional bodies, is that for legal, ethical and strategic reasons with regard to global secu-
rity and stability, meaningful human control over weapon systems and the use of force 
must be retained. For weapons used by the German Bundeswehr this means a level 
of supervisory control in which a human deliberates about a target before initiating 
any individual attack. Weapon systems that do not enable this level of human control 
should be either closely regulated (in the case of SARMO systems) or (in the case of 
weapons directed at human or human-inhabited targets) pre-emptively banned. In 
short, we recommend that the German government:
  develop a national policy on the use of autonomy in weapon systems and make 
that document publicly available;
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  adopt a simple, ICRC-like definition of autonomous weapon systems, based 
on the system’s «task autonomy» in the performance of the critical functions of 
selecting and engaging targets;
  stipulate the legal requirement of «meaningful human control» over all Bunde-
swehr weapon systems, avoiding autonomy in target selection beyond level 3 
(software selects the target and a human must approve it before the attack) thereby 
effectively prohibiting «fully autonomous weapon systems» at the national level;
  continuously investigate and map out levels of human control for autonomous 
functionality in future Bundeswehr weapon systems to allow the human reason-
ing and control needed (that is, levels 1-3 for critical functions), and train Bunde-
swehr personnel accordingly with regard to the required tactics, techniques and 
procedures;
  regulate the Bundeswehr’s continued use of SARMO systems so as to satisfy the 
strict targeting limitations and constraints on design and operations as these are 
specified in sections 1 and 6 above;
  continue and intensify support for an international, legally binding and verifiable 
ban on fully autonomous weapon systems, that is, weapon systems with auton-
omy in the performance of the critical functions of selecting and engaging targets.
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